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
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AND THE ARMY OF 2000



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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE  
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

**US GLOBAL RETRENCHMENT AND  
THE ARMY OF 2000**

**by**

**Alwyn H. King**

**10 April 1979**

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## FOREWORD

This memorandum considers the present period of US "global retrenchment." The author affirms that this phenomenon reflects a mood of introspection and a desire to withdraw from international commitments. He contends that the retrenchment is exemplified not only by overt physical acts such as planned and actual reductions in overseas force structure and refusal to provide military aid to counter Communist expansionism, but also in more subtle psychological and philosophical nuances. The author concludes with an assessment of the effects of "global retrenchment" on the Army of year 2000, in terms of the need for increased strategic mobility, command, control and communications, and an improved state of readiness of both active and reserve components.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are not necessarily constrained by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of current importance in areas related to the authors' professional work or interests.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR  
Major General, USA  
Commandant

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. ALWYN H. KING joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1973. He holds an engineering degree from McGill University, an MS from Columbia University and an MBA from Babson College, and a doctorate from Stuttgart Technical University in Germany. He has been associated with the Brunswick Corporation Research and Development Laboratories and with Arthur D. Little, Inc., and is the author of a number of articles and research reports in the literature of both the physical and social sciences. Dr. King holds the rank of Colonel in the US Army Retired Reserve.

The Strategic Studies Institute is a non-profit organization established in 1964 to provide a forum for the study and discussion of strategic issues. The Institute is located on the campus of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. It is a part of the Department of the Army, and its primary purpose is to conduct research and publish reports on strategic issues. The Institute is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Political Science Association, and the American Sociological Association.

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*Alwyn H. King*  
DR. ALWYN H. KING  
Major General USA  
Commandant

## **US GLOBAL RETRENCHMENT AND THE ARMY OF 2000**

**Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.**

**John F. Kennedy  
Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961**

### **THE CHANGING MOOD**

**An observer of today's international scene, reflecting on the current status of "liberty" in much of the world around him, finds it difficult to realize that only 18 years have elapsed since a newly-elected President of the United States made the above statement with the acceptance, and even enthusiastic approval, of a large proportion of his audience. Within that relatively short period of time much has happened to alter the perspectives of the US citizenry and their government. The tragedy of Vietnam dealt a shattering blow to those with supreme confidence in the invincibility of the United States and the superiority of the democratic system, and even presumably shook those among us who were ultimately responsible for our untimely withdrawal. The willingness and increasing capacity of the Soviet Union to project**



power globally, flagrantly and with impunity, interfering in the internal affairs of emerging nations, has further aggravated the situation. Coming in short order, the oil embargo and energy crisis added another shock and demonstrated all too clearly our vulnerability to resource-related coercion by otherwise internationally insignificant nations. Domestic racial and economic problems have contributed to social fragmentation and led to erosion of confidence in previously unassailable institutions. Our continuing dependence on foreign energy resources, and our seeming inability to agree on any national policy or program to reduce this dependence, further weaken our international position and contribute to frustration and disillusionment at home. The effect of all of this on the US world outlook and strategic posture is made clear by a comparison of President Kennedy's statement with the following quotation of President Carter:

However wealthy and powerful the United States may be—however capable of leadership—this power is increasingly relative, the leadership increasingly is in need of being shared.

Jimmy Carter, 1978<sup>1</sup>

There is an obvious dichotomy in the picture of a world superpower, inextricably—and even aggressively—involved economically and politically in international affairs, and yet reluctant to support its own interests or those of its allies with more than moral suasion. In the aftermath of Vietnam, US national will and resolve have been questioned, at least by implication, on a number of occasions.

Lloyd Matthews refers indirectly to a US lack of perseverance, when discussing Vietnam, with the statement:

As President Truman said of the fighting in Korea, 'Freedom still costs blood.' Let us hope that regardless of where their national interests and means dictate the stand be made—in Asia, in the Hemisphere, or wherever—Americans this time prove willing to stay the course.<sup>2</sup>

Robert Thompson said it much more forcefully in a *New York Times* article at the time of the final North Vietnamese offensive into the south.

The American retreat before Moscow, like that of Napoleon, is beginning to litter the route with corpses. . . . The Administration can no longer conduct a



credible American foreign policy. But, do not worry, a new foreign policy line has already been laid down by Congress: If you surrender, the killing will stop. It is a clear message, to the world, of the abject surrender of the United States.<sup>3</sup>

In considering such charges, it must be admitted that the United States in recent years promised considerably more to friends and allied nations than it has delivered. In earlier times, the alacrity with which this country forged alliances, projected nuclear umbrellas, and demonstrated a worldwide military presence on the basis of treaty arrangements led to the United States being reprovingly accused of the role of World Policeman. As Vietnam so poignantly demonstrated, however, the contemporary American character and the inertia and at times capricious nature of the democratic process have combined to severely limit the support actually forthcoming from the United States "to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 provided an almost unnoticed harbinger of this new development in US foreign affairs. After explicit encouragement (unofficially, via the "Voice of America") to the insurgents to rise up and throw off the yoke of oppression, this nation, the cradle of freedom, stood back and watched helplessly as those with the courage to heed our advice were attacked, deceived and slaughtered by their oppressors. Had they survived the Soviet perfidy, Imry Nagy and Pal Maleter could tell us more.

### INTERNATIONAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS

On the other hand, in our own defense we must point out that the age-old difficulty of attempting to perceive and understand the workings of alien governments contributes to mutual misunderstandings at least as much as any lack of courage or resolve on the part of the United States. For many nations unfamiliar with our democratic system of government, our national policies seem to vacillate, subject to unpredictable fluctuations; even to those more familiar with the democratic process, our colors sometimes appear to be "nailed firmly to the weathervane."

One factor which frequently contributes to international misunderstanding is the unfortunate circumstance wherein some of our political leaders, both candidate and incumbent, do not seem to

realize that their political utterances are heard not only by the voters to whom they are directed, but also by friends, enemies, and potential friends and potential enemies throughout the world. Many of these listeners are truly unenlightened. Never having been exposed to a democratic form of government, they do not understand that statements made during a political campaign are not necessarily true; that failure to honor a campaign promise is not necessarily a lie; and that a Presidential Proclamation made with all the pomp and ceremony of a Royal Decree still requires the concurrence of Joe Citizen from Albuquerque, or his representative, to become US policy and to be enacted. A disturbing example of this situation occurred during the 1976 US presidential campaign. In the newspapers of that time, we were faced with the peculiar and unflattering spectacle of a widely-respected spokesman for the US Government attempting to persuade the head of the Soviet Communist Party "...that everything that was said (during the campaign) was of no importance."

In an earlier and more devastating example of international misunderstanding, Tran Kim Phuong, Saigon's Ambassador to the United States, with somewhat limited knowledge of the democratic process, naively accepted at face value the clear and unmistakable pledge of our national leaders to supply South Vietnam with the weapons necessary to defend themselves. How could he realize that, after Saigon's acceptance of the inequitable Paris Agreement negotiated by the United States, this pledge would somehow fall through the cracks during the very democratic contest between the executive and legislative branches of the US Government over who had the power to determine the appropriate manner of US disengagement from the conflict?

## US GLOBAL RETRENCHMENT

Even allowing for the problems imposed by international misunderstanding, there is clear evidence of a pervasive trend toward global retrenchment, both psychological and physical, in US foreign policy. Whatever the causes of this phenomenon—the trauma of Vietnam, an increasing sense of urgency to solve pressing domestic problems, or other unidentified isolationist tendencies—current national attitudes and policies reflect a corporate mood of introspection and a consummate desire to withdraw from in-



ternational commitments. It is apparent that the United States is making a deliberate effort to reject the role of "global policeman" thrust upon it by the chaotic state of world affairs following World War II.

Advocates for a policy of retrenchment include such personages as George F. Kennan, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to Yugoslavia, and former head of the US State Department Policy Planning Staff. Kennan has proposed a global concept of American policy which would include "the reduction of external commitments to the indispensable minimum . . . the preservation of the political independence and military security of Western Europe, of Japan, and—with the single reservation that it should not involve the dispatch and commitment of American armed forces—of Israel." To accomplish this reduction, Kennan's plan would involve "the abandonment of several obsolescent and nonessential positions: notably those at Panama, in the Phillipines, and in Korea." In southern Africa he would "take cognizance . . . of the inability of ourselves or any other outside party to suggest . . . happy solutions to those problems," and in the rest of the Third World he recommends that we should "take account, again, of our general helplessness in the face of its problems . . ." Retrogressive as such recommendations may seem to some readers, they still do not equal those of one representative of the Institute of World Order, who has suggested that:

. . . the United States could reduce its defense expenditures by 5 to 10 percent (from the previous year) for probably as long as a decade without jeopardizing its security, even if the Soviet Union did not reciprocate.<sup>6</sup>

More rational voices are also to be heard in the ongoing discussions of retrenchment, and where the United States should "draw the line" of foreign involvement. Columnist Max Lerner has cautioned:

Granted that America cannot be everywhere and do everything, that it must be warier about its promises and canner about its commitments than in the past . . . But there must be clear thinking, however, not only about what America won't do but what it will do in making and meeting commitments.<sup>7</sup>

In a discussion of contemporary defense planning, Richard Lunsford, admitting that the image of the United States as a

"world policeman" has passed from vogue, still emphasizes the importance of US naval and amphibious forces afloat off other coasts as protectors of US citizens overseas and as a cost-effective means of encouraging commerce in otherwise high-risk areas.<sup>8</sup>

## THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND RETRENCHMENT

The Nixon Doctrine, first enunciated in 1969, was the first formal announcement of a new US approach to security planning which changed the allocation of responsibilities among non-Communist nations, and placed a new emphasis on shared strength. The three key elements of the new defense strategy were:

*First*, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

*Second*, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

*Third*, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.<sup>9</sup>

While this doctrine, as stated, appeared to be a reasonable plan for realistic apportionment of available US resources, and those of friendly nations, to the preservation of peace and security, attempts at practical application turned out somewhat less than satisfactory. Thomas Etzold, Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College has described, somewhat cuttingly, the application of the principle as follows:

. . . . American strategists devised a defense doctrine and posture called flexible response which was so complicated and convoluted that midway through a costly war they became confused, said the hell with it and went home, and then invented a Nixon Doctrine which explained why it was after all wise and right to keep American troops home in the next few years. It is small wonder that adversaries in foreign affairs—and even friends—considered the United States defense policy unpredictable and sometimes bewildering.<sup>10</sup>

In more serious and comprehensive treatment of the Nixon Doctrine in 1971, Colonel Rodman C. Rainville found that the



**“broad generalities and imprecise commitments . . . . create strong uncertainties as to the reliability and credibility of our involvement and invite tests of our resolve by our enemies and caution on the part of our friends.”<sup>11</sup>**

**Hindsight reveals the most ringing indictment of this initial move toward US global retrenchment in Richard Nixon’s own words of November 12, 1971:**

**Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form. . . .<sup>12</sup>**

**In any case, recent history in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, and the Middle East would support Rainville’s contention, and indicates that either the doctrine itself, or attempts to apply it in the real world have been unrealistic. Our unilateral abrogation of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, announced in December 1978, evidences a further retrenchment, to the point where even the tenets of the Nixon Doctrine are incompatible with our efforts to shed power and responsibility in the world environment.**

### **FACT AND FANCY**

**It must be admitted that, in theory, the measures of retrenchment consistent with the Nixon Doctrine and subsequent policy initiatives constitute a reasonable adjustment to the realities of US power and interests in the post -Vietnam era. The adjustment was intended to take place without significant change in the distribution of power and relationships among the major world nations. The United States is assumed to retain the dominant role in opposing Soviet expansionism, but at a lower level of effort and with an increased role for other friendly and allied nations. Less obviously, but in fact, this retrenchment reflects a desire to withdraw from international commitments, exemplified not only by overt physical acts such as planned and actual reductions in overseas force structure (e.g. Korea) and refusal to provide military aid to counter Communist expansionism (e.g. Angola), but also in more subtle psychological and philosophical nuances. Questions as to the utility of the use of military force, acceptance of an increasing dependence on foreign suppliers of critical materials (retrenchment from self-sufficiency?), and even the current emphasis on human rights to justify withholding military aid, could all conceivably be related to**

this global retrenchment and increased attention to domestic affairs. The principal difference between the current national mood of the United States and true isolationism is the fact that our present policy calls for military retrenchment without political disengagement. This, in itself, can be expected to complicate greatly the task of the armed forces in protecting US global political and economic interests.

### MILITARY RETRENCHMENT

From 1948 to 1964, there was a steady increase in the number of US military bases overseas. In the late 1950's and early 1960's the number of US military personnel overseas (excluding Vietnam) reached a peak of somewhat over one million, located in 30 different countries. Since 1965, the trend in numbers of troops and bases (again excluding Vietnam) has been steadily downward. From a total of approximately 700 US bases and installations of all sizes in 1957-58, that number had dropped about 43 percent to 400 in the late 1960's, and was down a total of 53 percent to 328 overseas bases in 1976. By the end of 1976 the number of military personnel overseas had also been reduced more than 50 percent, to about 500,000 stationed in 24 countries. The trend continues with current plans to withdraw 33,000 American ground combat troops from South Korea by 1982.<sup>13</sup>

Many of the overseas base closings and related personnel reductions during the past two decades have been the result of modernization and improvement of operations brought about by technological advances. These have often permitted a consolidation of functions among units, or among the various services, with improved efficiency. The advent of communications satellites, for example, allowed a significant reduction in communications and surveillance installations and units. Such reductions are beneficial, and would be expected to have no adverse effect on our military posture or preparedness.

There have been, on the other hand, troop redeployments and basing changes for political or economic reasons, which should be of concern to those responsible for our military preparedness. President De Gaulle's decree, for example, that all NATO bases should be removed from France, caused the reduction and consolidation of many US installations. The lingering effects of this



political decision are revealed in a GAO report of February 1978, which states:

"Since the US Forces' relocation from France in 1967, the Army has been trying to get a stable wartime supply line to support its troops in Central Europe. Despite concerted efforts there is still no reasonable assurance that adequate resupply stocks arriving from the United States could be delivered to US combat troops in a crisis."<sup>14</sup>

The decision to withdraw US ground combat forces from South Korea, politico-economically motivated, has generated substantial controversy and is another case where the ultimate effect on US military influence and effectiveness will bear close appraisal. New estimates of the strength of North Korea's army will undoubtedly stimulate further discussion and possible modification of this plan.<sup>15</sup>

In an evaluation of the Army's future role in the Pacific, given our planned withdrawal from Korea, Colonel Ward Le Hardy has proposed steps to be taken "to shore up our sagging credibility in the eyes of our allies," and to improve the US Army's posture in the Pacific. These include the reestablishment of USARPAC and the designation of certain divisions as "Pacific-oriented," with realistic contingency plans and exercises to demonstrate our ability and intent to support our allies in time of need.<sup>16</sup>

## EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Considerable discussion has centered on the likely effect of current US strategy on the outlook and policies of our major allies in Western Europe and Japan. It has been suggested that America's concession of strategic parity to the Soviet Union, combined with US military retrenchment, at a time when the Soviet global military presence and political influence are expanding rapidly, will tend to undermine allied confidence in the dependability of the United States as an ally and protector. Robert Osgood discusses this situation as follows:

If the United States nonetheless presses its military, economic, and diplomatic policies upon the allies, as one must expect the leader of the alliance to do, and at the same time tries to induce them to increase their share of the common defense burden, as the long-run stabilization of America's leadership requires, allied governments may decide that the

benefits of alliance are not worth the costs. They may then, collectively or individually, decide to rely upon their own accommodations with the adversaries, whether or not they try to back their diplomatic independence with military self-reliance.<sup>17</sup>

The consensus seems to be, however, that political obstacles to the development of independent military forces in West Europe and Japan will tend to sustain the present structure of relationships between the United States and its major allies. In the absence of a significant change in perception of the severity of the Soviet threat, or an apparent abandonment by the United States of its role in countering that threat, the present relationship will survive.

### IMPLICATIONS FOR US MILITARY PLANNERS

The most striking impact on military planning of a continuation of a global military retrenchment policy by the United States will be in the field of strategic mobility. Clearly, if US troops are withdrawn from strategically important areas, adequate air- or sea-lift, or both, must be provided to return them in time if subsequent events require it.

The ability to project military power throughout the world against serious opposition is difficult to achieve and costly to maintain. Even to move and effectively employ a relatively small force requires an extremely sophisticated military system, encompassing a worldwide communications system; a complicated logistical and administrative support system; and highly-trained air, naval and land forces that are accustomed to operating on a global scale. Planning and coordination before the fact is essential, to ensure that these capabilities will be available if needed, when contemplating any significant reduction of US forces or bases overseas.

As military retrenchment continues, appropriate US limited war strategies will depend increasingly on a responsive strategic reserve, thus an increasing demand for strategic mobility. Strategic mobility encompasses a number of factors—ready reaction forces, prepositioned materiel, host country support—but depends primarily on the capacities and capabilities of available means of transportation. For the immediate reaction necessary in modern warfare, strategic airlift is the key.

In his 1971 study of "Strategic Mobility and the Nixon Doc-



trine," Rainville noted that the 1973 strategic airlift projection called for 4 squadrons of C5A's and 14 squadrons of C141's, each squadron equipped with 16 operational aircraft. He further observed that the 70 C5A's to be provided as unit equipment represented a reduction from the original objective of 120, which would have equipped 6 squadrons with a total of 96 operational aircraft by the end of FY 72, and that "There are indications that the reduced procurement decision was not based on a determination that 70 C5A's will be adequate to meet revised projections of mobility requirements, but was constrained by the budgetary considerations."<sup>18</sup>

The "United States Military Posture for FY 1979," by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, still lists 70 C-5's (and 13 squadrons of C141's) in the active strategic airlift force, despite the fact that the "MOVECAP 70-74" analysis by the JCS, and a 1970 report of The Subcommittee on Military Airlift of the House Committee on Armed Services, both recorded a shortfall of at least two C5 squadrons in our strategic airlift capability.<sup>19</sup>

The above data, on the C5 aircraft alone, suggest that a careful analysis of our overall strategic mobility posture should precede any further retrenchment of US overseas military capability.

An AUSA Defense Report released in 1976 called strategic mobility the "Achilles Heel" of the US defense establishment. Two years later a similar report noted that little had been done to improve our capability to project combat power beyond our continental boundaries. An AUSA position paper analyzing the FY 1979 Defense Budget reported no additional capability planned for sealift forces, and modest improvements, but no augmentation, planned for airlift capabilities.<sup>20</sup>

A reduction in US overseas bases will also result in increased requirements for command, control, communications and intelligence facilities and capabilities within the military establishment. The Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1979 provides some encouraging remarks to indicate that this problem is recognized and is being acted upon:

The primary purpose of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) systems is to assess military and related situations around the world, and manage materiel and manpower in order to achieve national objectives. This task continues to increase in magnitude and complexity

because of the complexity and instability of international politics, and the improving technological capability of our potential adversaries.

A changing international political climate imposes increasing restrictions on and costs for the use of foreign territories for military purposes. In addition, crises may occur in remote areas where we do not have existing facilities. These factors require us to seek new alternatives, such as space systems and deployable facilities, which relieve us from dependence on foreign territory for C<sup>3</sup> operations and intelligence collection.

A capability to deploy command and control assets rapidly anywhere in the world is essential. A program is underway to develop a modular set of deployable facilities to provide for remote operations, communications to national, theater and force commanders, and command center support. The facilities can be tailored for a wide variety of operations, from joint task forces to disaster relief.<sup>21</sup>

Periodic reports of Soviet satellite intercept tests increase the complexity of this problem, and point out the need for increased US R&D in this area, both to match and exceed the Soviet capability, and to "harden" US communications satellites against this type of attack.

### IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY

If the US military retrenchment policy continues, Western Europe may soon be the only area in which US ground forces are stationed overseas. In other parts of the world, deterrence and defense of allies, as well as continued access to scarce strategic resources, may depend entirely on a credible US capability to move sufficient forces to any area of confrontation quickly and effectively. Both conventional wisdom and analytical studies of military operations in support of American diplomacy indicate that forces located abroad can support US policies more effectively than forces of equal capability kept at home, even when provisions are made to move the latter force quickly when needed.<sup>22</sup> It is patently obvious that, if provisions are not made to move the home-based force quickly when needed, the utility of that force approaches zero. This places our military leadership in a difficult position. With increasing competition on all sides for budgetary resources, and with mounting pressures to reduce military spending and thus further limit the means available, they are still expected to field a force capable of meeting all contingencies. A continuing high state



of readiness, and greater emphasis on training for rapid deployment, are obvious requirements for all Army units. Since budgetary considerations will probably result in reduced manpower strength, in the absence of increased international tension, increased emphasis on Reserve Component readiness will be essential. Even if the purely Army problems are adequately solved, the strategic lift capabilities of the Air Force and the Navy may well be the determining factor in the Army's ability to perform its mission.

There is abundant evidence that the influence of Army leadership on national policy, even in strategic and military matters, will deteriorate during this period of military retrenchment. This will further complicate the Army's task of ensuring adequate readiness to meet possible commitments, for example in influencing decisions related to budgeting for strategic airlift capability. Recent political decisions indicate a lack of military input into the decisionmaking process, and academics mourn "the dangers inherent in the soldier-statesman concept of military roles and responsibilities." Jerome Slater, of SUNY, proposes:

The most important institutional step that can now be taken to reestablish a proper balance between military and nonmilitary considerations in foreign policy would be to substantially reduce the role of military men in the policy formulation process.<sup>23</sup>

Indications are that the US Army of 2000 will face greatly increased competition for limited resources of funds and qualified manpower. At the same time, pressures will continue for the reduction of US military presence and involvement overseas. Thus, the importance of a capability to project small, highly effective forces on short notice to any likely area of the world will increase. If political/economic factors prevail, and US global retrenchment continues through the next decades, there is a danger that the build-up of our strategic mobility forces may fall behind that necessary to offset the reduction of US overseas military strength.

## CONCLUSION

Indications are that US foreign involvements will continue to decline, and will become primarily economically-oriented. With continually increasing competition for a share of a limited national

budget, continuing pressures for troop reductions and overseas base closings can be anticipated. If the international situation remains reasonably stable, and the threat of war appears to diminish over the next decades, pressures will also mount in the Congress for reductions in our overall military force structure. Before political decisions are made to effect such changes in our military posture, however, careful consideration should be given to possible negative secondary effects which could more than outweigh the purely financial or short-range political benefits. In addition to the obvious needs for increased strategic mobility and combat readiness to return to overseas locations if circumstances require it, other more subtle effects also require close scrutiny. Among these are reactions of allied and friendly nations in terms of US credibility and determination to honor previous commitments; possible interpretation of US military reticence by potential enemies as a sign of weakness and an invitation to adventurism; potential negative effects on US troop morale and attainment of recruiting goals; and in some cases, increased risk of interruption of supplies of strategic materials from overseas sources. In terms of national security, adequate contingency planning is needed in all of these areas to offset possible negative ramifications of otherwise positive national policies.



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need for increased strategic mobility, command, control and communications, and an improved state of readiness of both active and reserve components.

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